The Comment to Instruction 3.14 (Opinion Evidence, Expert Witnes) has a new paragraph discussing Diaz v. United States, 144 S. Ct. 1727 (2024).
There is a new last paragraph to the Comment to Instruction 14.15 (Firearms—Unlawful Possession (18 U.S.C. § 922(g))) discussing United tates v. Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. 1889 (2024).
The Comments to Instructions 14.22 (Firearms–Using, Carrying, or Brandishing in Commission of Crime of Violence or Drug Trafficking Crime (18 U.S.C. § 924(c))) and 14.23 (Firearms—Possession in Furtherance of Crime of Violence or Drug Trafficking Crime (18 U.S.C. § 924(c))) now cite United States v. Howald, 104 F.4th 732, 742-43 (9th Cir. 2024) (attempt to kill is an attempted use of force, distinguishing Taylor.
Also, the third paragraph of the Comment to Instruction 14.23 has been substantially revised:
The phrase “in furtherance of” requires proof that the defendant possessed the weapon with the subjective intent of promoting or facilitating the underlying crime. United States v. Irons, 31 F.4th 702, 711-12 (9th Cir. 2022) (finding error in jury instruction that only required “connection” between firearm and underlying crime).A district court does not err in failing separately to define “in furtherance of” in its instruction to the jury on possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. United States v. Lopez, 477 F.3d 1110, 1115-16 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 855 (2007) (instruction that separately listed requirements of possession and possession in furtherance of the crime eliminated the possibility that rational juror would convict defendant upon finding mere possession). “The question whether possession of a firearm is ‘in furtherance of’ a crime is a ‘fact-based inquiry into the nexus between possession of the firearm and the drug crime.’” Thongsy, 577 F.3d at 1041 (citation omitted). There is sufficient evidence that the possession was “in furtherance of” the underlying crime when the requisite nexus exists. Id.; see United States v.); see United States v. Mahan, 586 F.3d 1185, 1187-89 n.3 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that defendant who receives guns in exchange for drugs possesses those guns “in furtherance of” his drug trafficking offense). A district court does not err in failing separately to define “in furtherance of” in its instruction to the jury on possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. United States v. Lopez, 477 F.3d 1110, 1115-16 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 855 (2007) (instruction that separately listed requirements of possession and possession in furtherance of crime eliminated possibility that rational juror would convict defendant upon finding mere possession).
The Title to Instruction 17.1 now reads "Kidnapping—Interstate Transportation (18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)))."
The third element now reads:
[Third, the defendant intentionally transported [name of kidnapped person] across state lines]
or
[Third, the defendant [traveled in [interstate][foreign] commerce] [used the mail [in committing] [in furtherance of
committing] the offense]
or
[Third, the defendant used
[[the mail] [any [means] [facility] [instrumentality] of [interstate][foreign] commerce]] [[in [committing] [in furtherance of committing]]] the offense].
The first paragraph of the Comment (which talked about former language requiring that the kidnapping be for “ransom, reward, or other benefit") was removed. A new penultimate paragraph discussing jurisdiction has been added.
A new first paragraph of the Comment to Instruction 19.5 (Obstruction of Justice—Official Proceeding (18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)) now discusses Fischer v. United States, 144 S. Ct. 2176 (2024).
The new paragraph in the Comment to Instruction 20.27 (Transportation or Attempted Transportation for Prostitution or Criminal Sexual Activity (18 U.S.C. § 2421)) now discusses United States v. Stackhouse, 105 F.4th 1193 (9th Cir. 2024).