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Updated Sixth Circuit Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions

The Sixth Circuit published the yearly update to their Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions (the Circuit does not publish pattern civil instructions).

The Committee changed the text of two instructions:

• The definition of “willfully” in paragraph (2)(D) of Instruction 10.05 (Health Care Fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1347)) was corrected to require knowledge of the law based on United States v. Singh, 147 F.4th 652 (6th Cir. 2025). The Comment was amended accordingly, citing U.S. v. Bertram, 900 F.3d 743 (6th Cir. 2018).

• The definition of “during and in relation to” in Paragraph (2)(E) of Instruction 15.04 (Aggravated Identity Theft (18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1))) was adjusted based on United States v. King, 126 F.4th 440 (6th Cir. 2025). The Comment was amended accordingly, citing King and U.S. v. O’Lear, 90 F.4th 519 (6th Cir. 2024).

The Committee deleted the material on the Standard of Appellate Review.

Other changes to the use notes and commentaries include:

• The Comment to Instruction 1.03 (Presumption of Innocence, Burden of Proof, Reasonable Doubt) now includes this text:

  In 2025, Justice Sotomayor stated: Federal courts are not prohibited from defining reasonable doubt for the jury. In Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994), this Court held that ཞྭthe Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course.ཛྭ Id., at 5, 114 S.Ct. 1239. Almost all the Courts of Appeals abide by this understanding.

  * * *

  In view of the central importance of the reasonable-doubt standard to criminal procedure, balanced against the potential for confusion from a reasonable-doubt instruction, district courts should weigh the circumstances of each individual case to decide whether to provide a definition to the jury. Davenport v. United States, 146 S. Ct. 429, 430 (2025) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in denial of cert.) (some citations omitted).

• The Comment to Instruction 2.01 (Introduction) now cites Underwood and Smith instead of Ballentine.

• The Comments to Instructions 2.10 (Actual and Constructive Possession) and 2.10A (Actual Possession) now cite United States v. Underwood, 129 F.4th 912, 942 (6th Cir. 2025), for the proposition that "[I]f the government uses both actual and constructive possession theories and both are supported by sufficient evidence, it is not error to give both actual and constructive possession instructions."

• The Comment to Instruction 2.11 (Joint Possession) now cites United States v. Underwood, 129 F.4th 912, 942-943 (6th Cir. 2025) (stating that giving pattern instruction on joint possession instruction was appropriate when government alleged defendant owned the gun, having just purchased it from a third-party, but that he had given it to another third-party who was seen with it when police arrived).

• The Comment to Instruction 4.01 (Aiding and Abetting) also cites United States v. Underwood, 129 F.4th 912, 943 (6th Cir. 2025) (giving Inst. 4.01 was not error; rather, the case for an aiding and abetting instruction was particularly strong because the government expressly charged § 2 and the evidence supported this theory).

• The Comment to Instruction 14.02B (Dispensing or Distribution of a Controlled Substance by a Practitioner (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)) now notes United States v. Campbell, 135 F.4th 376, 386 (6th Cir. 2025) (discussing United States v. Ruan, 142 S. Ct. 2370 (2022)).

• A new paragraph has been added to the Comment to Instruction 14.05 (Conspiracy (21 U.S.C. § 846)):

  Practitioners may be convicted of conspiracy to violate the drug laws by dispensing or distributing controlled substances. See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 135 F.4th 376 (6th Cir. 2025), discussed in detail in the commentary to Inst. 14.02B. After the decision in United States v. Ruan, 142 S. Ct. 2370 (2022), a practitioner “cannot ‘knowingly’ agree to violate § 841 unless he agrees to commit acts he knows are unauthorized. Thus, the government cannot prove a § 846 violation unless it proves that the conspirators in the agreement knew they were actingསྭor intended to actསྭwithout a legitimate medical purpose in the usual course of professional practice.” Campbell at 386 (cleaned up).

• The Comments to Instructions 16.01 (Sexual Exploitation of Children: Using a Minor to Engage in Sexually Explicit Conduct to Produce a Visual Depiction (Production, 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a))), 16.05 (Material Involving the Sexual Exploitation of Minors: Receiving, Distributing, or Reproducing for Distribution a Visual Depiction (18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2))), and 16.09 (Coercion and Enticement: Persuading a Minor to Engage in Prostitution or Unlawful Sexual Activity (18 U.S.C. § 2422(b))) now discuss United States v. Jakits, 129 F.4th 314 (6th Cir. 2025).

• The Use Note for Instruction 17.02 (Hobbs Act – Extortion under Color of Official Right (18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)) now asserts that the Instruction "assumes that the property being obtained or sought by the public official was not a campaign contribution." The Comment notes that paragraph (1)(C) was approved in United States v. Householder, 137 F.4th 454, 472 (6th Cir. 2025).

• The Comment to Instruction 18.01 (Transmission of a Threat to Kidnap or Injure (18 U.S.C. § 875(c)) notes the possible applicability of Counterman v. Colorado, 143 S.Ct. 2106 (2023).

(07/05/26) (permalink)

Third Circuit 2026 Model Civil Jury Instructions

The Third Circuit has updated its Model Civil Jury Instructions. Prior versions of these instrctions are archived here.

(06/11/26) (permalink)

Ninth Circuit Web site is messed up

July Update. It took me a while to figure this out.

The Ninth Circuit has a general jury instruction page. If I go there, and then click on the link for either the civil or criminal instructions, I get a page that says "Your connection isn't private Attackers might be trying to steal your information from www3.ce9.uscourts.gov (for example, passwords, messages, or credit cards). net::ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID."

Howver, if I go directly to either the civil or criminal instructions, without using the links on the Ninth Circuit jury instruction page, I get access to those pages without the privacy message.

So I have changed all of the links on my site that go Ninth Circuit jury instructions, and have changed them so that they go to the civil or criminal instruction pages (as the case may be), and have deleted any links to the general Ninth Circuit jury instruction page.

I should note that the purported privacy error seemed unlikely to be coming from a government Web site, so I think it is a false alarm. But it annoys me, so my site bypasses those pages.

(06/10/26) (permalink)

Ninth Circuit March 2026 revisions

The Ninth Circuit has posted March 2026 revisions to its civil and criminal Model Jury Instructions I have only spotted one substantive change to the Civil Instructions. The Comment to Instruction 18.5 (Securities—Knowingly and Reckless) now ends with this new paragraph:

Scienter can also be shown “in the rare circumstances” when allegations are “not particularized,” but “the nature of the relevant fact is of such prominence that it would be absurd to suggest that management was without knowledge of the matter.” Construction Laborers Pension Tr. of Greater St. Louis v. Funko, Inc., 166 F.4th 805, 831 (9th Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In Funko, the court held that plaintiffs alleged scienter based on the theory that CEO and CFO of company had to know about problems with inventory and implementation of new ERP software, since those were main areas of focus and concern for the company. Id. at 833-34.

The criminal changes are as follows:

• The Comment to Instruction 2.10 (Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts of Defendant) now discusses United States v. Justus, 162 F.4th 962, 968-69 (9th Cir. 2025), and United States v. Ruiz, 167 F.4th 1024, 1035 (9th Cir. 2026).

• The Comment to Instruction 3.3 (Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts of Defendant), now discusses Justus.

• The discussion of United States v. Keiser, 57 F.3d 847, 854 (9th Cir. 1995), in the Comment to Instruction 3.5 (Character of Victim) has been rewritten, and now discusses United States v. Olivas, 150 F.4th 1107 (9th Cir. 2025).

• The Comment to Instruction 5.7 (Duress, Coercion, or Compulsion (Legal Excuse)) now notes Justus.

• The Comment to Instruction 6.22 (Jury Consideration of Punishment) has a new paragraph:

  “[I]t is inappropriate for a jury to consider or be informed of the consequences of their verdict.” United States v. Frank, 956 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991). There may be “particular, limited circumstances,” however, when “‘an instruction of some form’ as to the consequences of a verdict” is necessary to ensure the jury remains “focused on the facts, the evidence, and the witnesses’ credibility.” United States v. Dencklau, 160 F.4th 1046, 1061 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 587-88 (1994)) (rejecting challenge to jury instructions that informed jurors that cooperating witnesses faced the death penalty, but that defendants did not, that sentencing was the judge’s job, and that the jury should consider a witness’s interest in the outcome of a case and their cooperation in evaluating the witness’s credibility).

• The Comment to Instruction 14.15 (Firearms—Unlawful Possession (18 U.S.C. § 922(g))) now observes that "18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(i) is not facially unconstitutional '[w]hen an individual poses a clear threat of physical violence to another, the threatening individual may be disarmed," citing United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 688-700 (2024).

• Instructions 15.32 (Mail Fraud—Scheme to Defraud or to Obtain Money or Property by False Promises (18 U.S.C. § 1341)), 15.35 (Wire Fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343)), 15.36 (Bank Fraud—Scheme to Defraud Bank (18 U.S.C. § 1344(1))), 15.39 (Bank Fraud—Scheme to Defraud by False Promises (18 U.S.C. § 1344(2))), 15.40 (Attempted Bank Fraud—Scheme to Defraud by False Promises (18 U.S.C. § 1344)), and 15.42 (Health Care Fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1347)) add this definition of materiality: "[An oral or written statement is material if it has a natural tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing, a person to part with money or property. Neither proof of reliance on a false statement nor actual harm is needed to show materiality.]"

• Instruction 15.35 adds the following: "[A half-truth is a representation that states the truth only so far as it goes, while omitting critical qualifying information.]" The Comment now discusses United States v. Jesenik, 152 F.4th 924, 940-43 (9th Cir. 2025).

• The Comment to Instruction 18.8 (Violent Crime or Attempted Violent Crime in Aid of Racketeering Enterprise (18 U.S.C. § 1959)) has been substantially rewritten, apparently because of United States v. Manning, 151 F.4th 1144 (9th Cir. 2025).

• The Comments to Instructions 20.19 (Sexual Exploitation of Child—Permitting or Assisting by Parent or Guardian (18 U.S.C. § 2251(b))), 20.20 (Sexual Exploitation of Child—Transportation of Visual Depiction into United States (18 U.S.C. § 2251(c))), and 20.21 (Sexual Exploitation of Child—Notice or Advertisement Seeking or Offering (18 U.S.C. § 2251(d))) now direct readers to see Instruction 20.18 for the factors to consider regarding a “lascivious exhibition of the anus, genitals or pubic area of any person” as contained in the statutory definition of “sexually explicit conduct.”

• The first sentence of Instruction 24.31 (Paying A Bribe—Elements (18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2))) now reads "The defendant is charged in [Count ___ of] the indictment with accepting paying a bribe in a violation of Section 666 (a)(2) of Title 18 the United States Code."

(05/05/26) (permalink)