The Ninth Circuit has posted March 2026 revisions to its
Model Jury Instructions. I have only spotted one substantive change to the Civil Instructions. The Comment to Instruction 18.5 (Securities—Knowingly and Reckless) now ends with this new paragraph:
Scienter can also be shown “in the rare circumstances” when allegations are “not particularized,” but “the nature of the relevant fact is of such prominence that it would be absurd to suggest that management was without knowledge of the matter.” Construction Laborers Pension Tr. of Greater St. Louis v. Funko, Inc., 166 F.4th 805, 831 (9th Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In Funko, the court held that plaintiffs alleged scienter based on the theory that CEO and CFO of company had to know about problems with inventory and implementation of new ERP software, since those were main areas of focus and concern for the company. Id. at 833-34.
The criminal changes are as follows:
The Comment to Instruction 2.10 (Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts of Defendant) now discusses United States v. Justus, 162 F.4th 962, 968-69 (9th Cir. 2025), and United States v. Ruiz, 167 F.4th 1024, 1035 (9th Cir. 2026).
The Comment to Instruction 3.3 (Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts of Defendant), now discusses Justus.
The discussion of United States v. Keiser, 57 F.3d 847, 854 (9th Cir. 1995), in the Comment to Instruction 3.5 (Character of Victim) has been rewritten, and now discusses United States v. Olivas, 150 F.4th 1107 (9th Cir. 2025).
The Comment to Instruction 5.7 (Duress, Coercion, or Compulsion (Legal Excuse)) now notes Justus.
The Comment to Instruction 6.22 (Jury Consideration of Punishment) has a new paragraph:
“[I]t is inappropriate for a jury to consider or be informed of the consequences of their verdict.” United States v. Frank, 956 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991). There may be “particular, limited circumstances,” however, when “‘an instruction of some form’ as to the consequences of a verdict” is necessary to ensure the jury remains “focused on the facts, the evidence, and the witnesses’ credibility.” United States v. Dencklau, 160 F.4th 1046, 1061 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 587-88 (1994)) (rejecting challenge to jury instructions that informed jurors that cooperating witnesses faced the death penalty, but that defendants did not, that sentencing was the judge’s job, and that the jury should consider a witness’s interest in the outcome of a case and their cooperation in evaluating the witness’s credibility).
The Comment to Instruction 14.15 (Firearms—Unlawful Possession (18 U.S.C. § 922(g))) now observes that "18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(i) is not facially unconstitutional '[w]hen an individual poses a clear threat of physical violence to another, the threatening individual may be disarmed," citing United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 688-700 (2024).
Instructions 15.32 (Mail Fraud—Scheme to Defraud or to Obtain Money or Property by False Promises (18 U.S.C. § 1341)), 15.35 (Wire Fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343)), 15.36 (Bank Fraud—Scheme to Defraud Bank (18 U.S.C. § 1344(1))), 15.39 (Bank Fraud—Scheme to Defraud by False Promises (18 U.S.C. § 1344(2))), 15.40 (Attempted Bank Fraud—Scheme to Defraud by False Promises (18 U.S.C. § 1344)), and 15.42 (Health Care Fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1347)) add this definition of materiality: "[An oral or written statement is material if it has a natural tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing, a person to part with money or property. Neither proof of reliance on a false statement nor actual harm is needed to show materiality.]"
Instruction 15.35 adds the following: "[A half-truth is a representation that states the truth only so far as it goes, while omitting critical qualifying information.]" The Comment now discusses United States v. Jesenik, 152 F.4th 924, 940-43 (9th Cir. 2025).
The Comment to Instruction 18.8 (Violent Crime or Attempted Violent Crime in Aid of Racketeering Enterprise (18 U.S.C. § 1959)) has been substantially rewritten, apparently because of United States v. Manning, 151 F.4th 1144 (9th Cir. 2025).
The Comments to Instructions 20.19 (Sexual Exploitation of Child—Permitting or Assisting by Parent or Guardian (18 U.S.C. § 2251(b))), 20.20 (Sexual Exploitation of Child—Transportation of Visual Depiction into United States (18 U.S.C. § 2251(c))), and 20.21 (Sexual Exploitation of Child—Notice or Advertisement Seeking or Offering (18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)))
now direct readers to see Instruction 20.18 for the factors to consider regarding a “lascivious exhibition of the anus, genitals or pubic area of any person” as contained in the statutory definition of “sexually explicit conduct.”
The first sentence of Instruction 24.31 (Paying A Bribe—Elements (18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2))) now reads "The defendant is charged in [Count ___ of] the indictment with acceptingpaying a bribe in a violation of Section 666 (a)(2) of Title 18 the United States Code."