The Sixth Circuit published the yearly update to their
Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions (the Circuit does not publish pattern civil instructions).
The Committee changed the text of two instructions:
The definition of “willfully” in paragraph (2)(D) of Instruction 10.05 (Health Care Fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1347)) was corrected to require knowledge of the law based on United States v. Singh, 147 F.4th 652 (6th Cir. 2025). The Comment was amended accordingly, citing U.S. v. Bertram, 900 F.3d 743 (6th Cir. 2018).
The definition of “during and in relation to” in Paragraph (2)(E) of Instruction 15.04 (Aggravated Identity Theft (18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1))) was adjusted based on United States v. King, 126 F.4th 440 (6th Cir. 2025). The Comment was amended accordingly, citing King and U.S. v. O’Lear, 90 F.4th 519 (6th Cir. 2024).
The Committee deleted the material on the Standard of Appellate Review.
Other changes to the use notes and commentaries include:
The Comment to Instruction 1.03 (Presumption of Innocence, Burden of Proof, Reasonable Doubt) now includes this text:
In 2025, Justice Sotomayor stated:
Federal courts are not prohibited from defining reasonable doubt for the jury. In
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994), this Court held that ཞྭthe Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course.ཛྭ Id., at 5, 114 S.Ct. 1239. Almost all the Courts of Appeals abide by this understanding.
* * *
In view of the central importance of the reasonable-doubt standard to criminal procedure, balanced against the potential for confusion from a reasonable-doubt instruction, district courts should weigh the circumstances of each individual case to decide whether to provide a definition to the jury.
Davenport v. United States, 146 S. Ct. 429, 430 (2025) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in denial of cert.) (some citations omitted).
The Comment to Instruction 2.01 (Introduction) now cites Underwood and Smith instead of Ballentine.
The Comments to Instructions 2.10 (Actual and Constructive Possession) and 2.10A (Actual Possession) now cite United States v. Underwood, 129 F.4th 912, 942 (6th Cir. 2025), for the proposition that "[I]f the government uses both actual and constructive possession theories and both are supported by sufficient evidence, it is not error to give both actual and constructive possession instructions."
The Comment to Instruction 2.11 (Joint Possession) now cites United States v. Underwood, 129 F.4th 912, 942-943 (6th Cir. 2025) (stating that giving pattern instruction on joint possession instruction was appropriate when government alleged defendant owned the gun, having just purchased it from a third-party, but that he had given it to another third-party who was seen with it when police arrived).
The Comment to Instruction 4.01 (Aiding and Abetting) also cites United States v. Underwood, 129 F.4th 912, 943 (6th Cir. 2025) (giving Inst. 4.01 was not error; rather, the case for an aiding and abetting instruction was particularly strong because the government expressly charged § 2 and the evidence supported this theory).
The Comment to Instruction 14.02B (Dispensing or Distribution of a Controlled Substance by a Practitioner (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)) now notes United States v. Campbell, 135 F.4th 376, 386 (6th Cir. 2025) (discussing United States v. Ruan, 142 S. Ct. 2370 (2022)).
A new paragraph has been added to the Comment to Instruction 14.05 (Conspiracy (21 U.S.C. § 846)):
Practitioners may be convicted of conspiracy to violate the drug laws by dispensing or distributing controlled substances. See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 135 F.4th 376 (6th Cir. 2025), discussed in detail in the commentary to Inst. 14.02B. After the decision in United States v. Ruan, 142 S. Ct. 2370 (2022), a practitioner “cannot ‘knowingly’ agree to violate § 841 unless he agrees to commit acts he knows are unauthorized. Thus, the government cannot prove a § 846 violation unless it proves that the conspirators in the agreement knew they were actingསྭor intended to actསྭwithout a legitimate medical purpose in the usual course of professional practice.” Campbell at 386 (cleaned up).
The Comments to Instructions 16.01 (Sexual Exploitation of Children: Using a Minor to Engage in Sexually Explicit Conduct to Produce a Visual Depiction (Production, 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a))), 16.05 (Material Involving the Sexual Exploitation of Minors: Receiving, Distributing, or Reproducing for Distribution a Visual Depiction (18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2))), and 16.09 (Coercion and Enticement: Persuading a Minor to Engage in Prostitution or Unlawful Sexual Activity (18 U.S.C. § 2422(b))) now discuss United States v. Jakits, 129 F.4th 314 (6th Cir. 2025).
The Use Note for Instruction 17.02 (Hobbs Act – Extortion under Color of Official Right (18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)) now asserts that the Instruction "assumes that the property being obtained or sought by the public official was not a campaign contribution." The Comment notes that paragraph (1)(C) was approved in United States v. Householder, 137 F.4th 454, 472
(6th Cir. 2025).
The Comment to Instruction 18.01 (Transmission of a Threat to Kidnap or Injure
(18 U.S.C. § 875(c)) notes the possible applicability of Counterman v. Colorado,
143 S.Ct. 2106 (2023).